A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain

被引：1

作者：

Elkind, Edith ^{[1
]}

Faliszewski, Piotr ^{[2
]}

Skowron, Piotr ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oxford, Oxford, England

[2] AGH Univ Sci & Technol, Krakow, Poland

[3] Univ Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2020年 / 54卷 / 01期

基金：

新加坡国家研究基金会; 欧洲研究理事会;

关键词：

INTERMEDIATE PREFERENCES; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS;

D O I：

10.1007/s00355-019-01216-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We characterize elections that are simultaneously single-peaked and single-crossing (SPSC), by establishing a connection between this domain and that of minimally rich elections, i.e., elections where each candidate is ranked first by at least one voter. Specifically, we show that an election is both single-peaked and single-crossing if and only if it can be obtained from a minimally rich single-crossing election by deleting voters.

引用

页码：167 / 181

页数：15

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