Energy Pricing Policies and the International Trade Regime

Energy subsidy and pricing reform is widely heralded as a necessity to transition to sustainable development and keep global warming below 2 degrees C. Energy pricing policies and subsidies are also at the heart of the energy-trade-climate nexus, but progress has been slow within the international trade regime. This is unlike other international organizations or networks, where progress has been more substantial. This article investigates the lack of legitimacy to regulate or coordinate pricing reform and links it to fundamentally divergent interests between fuel producers and importers. The article discusses the regulatory and coordinative potential of the World Trade Organization and preferential trade agreements. It finds that at the World Trade Organization, the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, case law, Ricardian theory, and negotiation history all preempt the consideration of most pricing policies as subsidies. As a result, subsidy notification within the World Trade Organization is low and while other options for improving transparency via the Committee on Trade and Environment and Trade Policy Review Mechanism have been suggested, not much has actually happened because producers protect their comparative advantage. Therefore, support for fuel pricing reform remains on a general level via Ministerial Statements or through general provisions in preferential trade agreements that reconfirm the G-20 and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation commitments to fuel subsidy reform. The only real advancement has been made within bilateral trade negotiations where heavyweights such as the European Union can push trading partners to abandon dual pricing policies.