Corporate boards, large blockholders and executive compensation in banks: Evidence from Poland

被引：24

作者：

Slomka-Golebiowska, Agnieszka ^{[1
]}

Urbanek, Piotr ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Warsaw Sch Econ, Dept Comparat Studies, 164 Al Niepodleglosci, PL-02554 Warsaw, Poland

[2] Univ Lodz, 41 Rewolucji 1905 St, PL-90255 Lodz, Poland

来源：

EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW | 2016年 / 28卷

关键词：

Executive compensation; Corporate governance; Ownership structure; Banking; CEO COMPENSATION; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; MANAGERIAL POWER; GOVERNANCE; PAY; PERFORMANCE; RISK; EXPROPRIATION; DIRECTORS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ememar.2016.08.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

The paper aims to investigate the impact of uniform board governance standards on the level of executive pay in banks with a controlling shareholder. Based on the sample of a hand-collected data on all executive pay of all public banks in Poland from 2005 to 2013, we find that board independence is negatively associated with executive compensation. In contrast to widely-held banks, independent directors in banks controlled by a blockholder provide restraint on the tendency to overcompensate. Thus, in concentrated ownership structure managerial power theory prevails over agency theory. However, the effect might be diluted as the number of board members increases. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：203 / 220

页数：18

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