Optimal and equilibrium balking strategies in the single server Markovian queue with catastrophes

被引:82
|
作者
Boudali, Olga [1 ]
Economou, Antonis [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Athens, Dept Math, Athens 15784, Greece
关键词
Queueing; Catastrophes; Balking; Nash equilibrium strategies; Social optimization; INFORMATION; TOLLS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2011.11.043
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We consider a Markovian queue subject to Poisson generated catastrophes. Whenever a catastrophe occurs, all customers are forced to abandon the system, the server is rendered inoperative and an exponential repair time is set on. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the balking behavior of the customers and derive the corresponding Nash equilibrium and social optimal strategies. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:708 / 715
页数:8
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