RICH: Strategy-proof and efficient coflow scheduling in non-cooperative environments

被引:0
|
作者
Zhang, Fan [1 ,2 ]
Tang, Yazhe [1 ,2 ]
Shan, Danfeng [1 ,2 ]
Wang, Huanzhao [1 ,2 ]
Hu, Chengchen [3 ]
机构
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Minist Educ, Key Lab Intelligent Network & Network Secur, Xian, Peoples R China
[2] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Comp Sci & Technol, Xian, Peoples R China
[3] NIO Inc, Shanghai, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Coflow scheduling; Datacenter networks; Data-intensive applications;
D O I
10.1016/j.jnca.2021.103233
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Coflow scheduling can effectively improve the application performance and has been studied a lot in cooperative environments (e.g., private datacenter networks), where fairness is not the primary concern. In non-cooperative environments (e.g., multi-tenant datacenter networks), coflow scheduling should be strategy proof; otherwise, some tenants could unfairly acquire more resources by cheating the scheduler. As minimizing coflow completion time (CCT) must prioritize coflows based on some specific rules (e.g., shortest-coflowfirst, smallest-effective-bottleneck-first), tenants can raise the priority of their coflows by lying about the coflow information. Thus, it is a common belief that optimizing coflow performance can inevitably violate strategy-proofness. In this paper, we argue that the average CCT can be reduced without violating strategy-proofness. Our key insight is that prioritization can inherently achieve better CCT even without those specific rules such as smallest-effective-bottleneck-first. We propose RICH, a coflow scheduler in non-cooperative environments. At its heart, RICH splits the time into multiple rounds. In each round, RICH ensures that the total data transmitted by each tenant can provide optimal isolation guarantee. Among different rounds, RICH prioritizes coflow transmission among tenants in a round-robin manner. In this way, all tenants are fairly prioritized, and tenants do not necessarily gain more bandwidth by cheating. Extensive simulations show that RICH outperforms other strategy-proof mechanisms by up to 39.3% in terms of average CCT.
引用
收藏
页数:13
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