Characteristic Function and Time Consistency for Two-Stage Games with Network Externalities

被引:2
|
作者
Sedakov, Artem [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] St Petersburg State Univ, Dept Math Game Theory & Stat Decis, 7-9 Univ Skaya Nab, St Petersburg 199034, Russia
[2] Qingdao Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Qingdao 266071, Peoples R China
[3] Inst Appl Math Shandong, Qingdao 266071, Peoples R China
基金
俄罗斯科学基金会;
关键词
network externalities; cooperation; public goods provision; market competition; time consistency; OLIGOPOLY GAMES; PUBLIC-GOODS; CONVEXITY;
D O I
10.3390/math8010038
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
Time consistency is a property of the solution to a cooperative dynamic game which guarantees that this solution remains stable with respect to its revision by players over time. The fulfillment of this property is directly related to the characteristic function and its behavior with the course of the game as any solution is based on this function. In this paper, we will examine the characteristic functions for two economic models with network externalities represented by a two-stage network game using the theory developed for this class of games. For a network game with positive externalities represented by a public goods provision model, we demonstrate a sufficient condition for time consistency. For a network game with negative externalities represented by a market competition model, we show that the cooperative solution is always time consistent.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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