Hyperbole or Reality? Investor Response to Extreme Language in Earnings Conference Calls

被引:50
|
作者
Bochkay, Khrystyna [1 ]
Hales, Jeffrey [2 ]
Chava, Sudheer [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
[2] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[3] Georgia Inst Technol, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
来源
ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2020年 / 95卷 / 02期
关键词
extreme language; market reactions; analyst forecast revisions; future performance; earnings conference calls; textual analysis; INFORMATION-CONTENT; ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT; TEXTUAL ANALYSIS; TONE; PRESENTATIONS; UNDERREACTION; READABILITY; COMPLEXITY; SENTIMENT; ANALYSTS;
D O I
10.2308/accr-52507
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We develop a dictionary of linguistic extremity in earnings conference calls, a setting where managers have considerable latitude in the language they use, to study the role of extreme language in corporate reporting. Controlling for tone (positive versus negative) of language, we document that when managers use more extreme words in earnings conference calls, trading volume around the call increases and stock prices react more strongly. In addition, both effects are more pronounced for firms with weaker information environments. Linguistic extremity also affects analyst opinions and contains information about a firm's future operating performance. As such, our results provide evidence that markets are influenced not just by what managers say, but also how they say it, with extreme language playing an important role in communicating reality and not merely reflecting hyperbole.
引用
收藏
页码:31 / 60
页数:30
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