Pay Me Later: Savings Constraints and the Demand for Deferred Payments

被引:8
|
作者
Brune, Lasse [1 ]
Chyn, Eric [2 ,3 ]
Kerwin, Jason [4 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Global Poverty Res Lab, Kellogg Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Dartmouth Coll, Dept Econ, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] Univ Minnesota, Dept Appl Econ, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
来源
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2021年 / 111卷 / 07期
基金
美国食品与农业研究所;
关键词
FIELD EXPERIMENT; SELF-CONTROL; INCENTIVES; POOR; ECONOMICS; BANKING; PRODUCT; POWER;
D O I
10.1257/aer.20191657
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study a simple savings scheme that allows workers to defer receipt of part of their wages for three months at zero interest. The scheme significantly increases savings during the deferral period, leading to higher postdisbursement spending on lumpy goods. Two years later, after two additional rounds of the savings scheme, we find that treated workers have made permanent improvements to their homes. The popularity of the scheme implies a lack of good alternative savings options. The results of a follow-up experiment suggest that demand for the scheme is partly due to its ability to address self-control issues.
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页码:2179 / 2212
页数:34
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