There is considerable criminological interest in the place of emotion in influencing views about crime and punishment. It is increasingly recognised that while politicians insist that it is evidence' that guides their policy, this claim obscures some of the emotional influences on attitudes to crime and punishment. Yet the scholarly debate has been limited by, first, an exaggerated and contrived distinction between emotion and cognition; and, second, an over-general conception of emotion which loses some critical distinctions among different types. Specifically, the emotions of punishment meet the defining criteria of moral emotions. Some of the ways in which crime and punishment may trigger our moral emotions are discussed and the moral foundations', postulated by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, are applied to an understanding of views about punishment. This analysis explains why views about punishment are often defended so tenaciously and debate is unsatisfactory and ill-tempered. An appreciation of the influences that shape attitudes to crime and punishment is a precondition of trying to change them.
