Partial cross-ownership and strategic environmental policy

被引：29
|
作者：
Carlos Barcena-Ruiz, Juan [1 ]
Luz Campo, Maria [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Basque Country, Fac Ciencias Econ & Empresariales, Dept Fundamentos Anal Econ 1, Bilbao 48015, Spain
来源：
RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 34卷 / 02期
关键词：
Environmental taxes; International trade; Global pollution; Partial ownership; TAX COMPETITION; TAXATION; OLIGOPOLY; LOCATION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.reseneeco.2011.12.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper analyzes the effect of passive investment in rival firms on the setting of cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes. We consider two firms located in different countries, with each firm owning the same percentage of the stock of its rival. We show that bilateral partial cross-ownership affects the taxes set by the countries in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. When the stake that one firm has in its rival is great enough and environmental spillovers are low enough, cooperative taxes are lower than non-cooperative taxes. For the remaining values of parameters the opposite result is obtained. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：198 / 210
页数：13
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