Does Corruption Hinder Private Businesses? Leadership Stability and Predictable Corruption in China

被引:59
|
作者
Zhu, Jiangnan [1 ]
Zhang, Dong [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
关键词
POLITICAL INSTABILITY; INVESTMENT; INSTITUTIONS; PERFORMANCE; BRIBERY; FIRMS; POWER;
D O I
10.1111/gove.12220
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
We study whether corruption hinders businesses by investigating China's private enterprises, which have developed rapidly despite high corruption levels. We argue that a key factor determining the effects of corruption is corruption predictability, which is significantly influenced by government leadership stability. When the same leaders remain in major offices for long tenures, corruption is relatively predictable, reducing hindrance to businesses. When leaders change frequently, entrepreneurs need to constantly cultivate new connections with officials and face more uncertainty; therefore, corruption becomes a major obstacle. We conduct field interviews to explore channels through which leadership stability encourages predictable corruption. We also use the 2012 World Bank Enterprise Survey of Chinese private firms and develop a novel measure of leadership stability of the local Chinese government based on a self-collected data set of municipal party committees to test our hypotheses. Results of various models are consistent with our hypotheses.
引用
收藏
页码:343 / 363
页数:21
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Who pays more "tributes" to the government? sectoral corruption of China's private enterprises
    Zhu, Jiangnan
    Wu, Yiping
    [J]. CRIME LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 2014, 61 (03) : 309 - 333
  • [32] Does political corruption affect mergers and acquisitions decisions? Evidence from China
    Yang, Hao
    Zhang, Qiusheng
    Zhao, Xiaofang
    Wang, Zhongchao
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2022, 78 : 248 - 266
  • [33] After the Bo Xilai Trial: Does Corruption Threaten China's Future?
    Broadhurst, Roderic
    Wang, Peng
    [J]. SURVIVAL, 2014, 56 (03) : 157 - 177
  • [34] Does China's Anti-Corruption Campaign Promote Corporate Innovation?
    党力
    [J]. China Economist, 2016, 11 (02) : 95 - 108
  • [35] Does Increased Civil Service Pay Deter Corruption? Evidence from China
    Gong, Ting
    Wu, Alfred M.
    [J]. REVIEW OF PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION, 2012, 32 (02) : 192 - 204
  • [36] China's anti-corruption campaign, political connections and private firms' debt financing
    Hu, Yiming
    Xu, Mingxia
    [J]. CHINA FINANCE REVIEW INTERNATIONAL, 2019, 9 (04) : 521 - 553
  • [37] Does crackdown on corruption reduce stock price crash risk? Evidence from China
    Chen, Yunsen
    Xie, Yuan
    You, Hong
    Zhang, Yanan
    [J]. JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2018, 51 : 125 - 141
  • [38] Perceived cadre corruption and government responsibility in China: does the blame stay local, and why (not)?
    Harmel, Robert
    Yeh, Yao-Yuan
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY-REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE, 2020, 30 (03): : 519 - 538
  • [39] Does Poverty Relief Breed Corruption? An Evaluation of China’s Poverty Alleviation Program
    Kai Wang
    [J]. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2022, 27 : 341 - 374
  • [40] How does anti-corruption campaign affect the labour income share in China?
    He, Zhen
    Wang, Xiaolong
    Yang, Liu
    [J]. APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2019, 26 (16) : 1345 - 1348