Personnel Decisions, Wage Profiles and Investment in Firms

被引:0
|
作者
Skatun, John Douglas [1 ]
Theodossiou, Ioannis [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Aberdeen, Univ Aberdeen Business Sch, Aberdeen AB9 1FX, Scotland
关键词
EMPLOYER-SIZE; LABOR-MARKETS; SAMPLE SELECTION; EARLY ADOPTION; HOLD-UP; WORKERS; TECHNOLOGY; EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION; CONTRACTS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-8543.2011.00867.x
中图分类号
F24 [劳动经济];
学科分类号
020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
An investment model where firms mitigate adverse hold-up effects using hiring and personnel policies is theoretically investigated and empirically scrutinized. While no evidence for the prediction of differing worker characteristics, other than gender, across firms is found, demand (firm) side factors are evident in the hiring process. Evidence on other personnel policies is consistent with theory, which predicts firms with high-investment expenditures resist unions, utilize more temporary and shift-time workers and conduct more multitask training. Wages in high-investment firms are higher, more sensitive to unemployment and experience variables that exhibit greater effects than in low-investment firms.
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收藏
页码:742 / 766
页数:25
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