Perception, Empiricism, and Pragmatist Realism

被引:0
|
作者
Grigoriev, Serge [1 ]
机构
[1] Ithaca Coll, Dept Philosophy & Relig, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA
关键词
PEIRCE;
D O I
10.1163/18758185-90000190
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This article compares Peirce's pragmatist approach to the problem of perceptual experience as a fallible foundation of knowledge to a sophisticated empiricist position. While empiricism can accommodate the idea of perception as fallible, theoretically laden, and containing conjectural elements, the cardinal difference between pragmatism and empiricism consists in the pragmatist insistence on the intrinsic intelligibility of experience, which also serves as the ultimate source of all forms of intelligibility. Empiricism, on the other hand, retains a penchant for fitting experiences into abstract conceptual schemes.
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页码:191 / 210
页数:20
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