Institutions, military policy, and human rights in Colombia

Politicians operating within this framework have been successful in reducing certain elements of military power within the Colombian political system and implementing some reforms. There has, however, been little progress in areas such as military impunity, the strength of paramilitary death squads,3 and the reduction of military autonomy (Leal Buitrago, 1994; Pizarro, 1995; Dávila, 1998). Thus, democratic institutions are broadened and grow more inclusive while the coercive apparatus of repression remains largely intact in the form of a "dirty war," with union activists, leftist party militants, human rights workers, and other representatives of oppositional politics bearing the brunt of it. To establish support for this argument, I begin by describing two analytical approaches to military and security policies, institutional and societal. A brief discussion revealing how the two dominant political parties have been interlinked with economic elites historically and how the doctrine and behavior of the armed forces have reflected these linkages follows this theoretical exposition. I subsequently address how these linkages have impacted the policies of various governments in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, I examine the role that these relationships played in the policy making of the Samper government (1994-1998). The executive branch is the focus of this analysis, as it is the strongest policy-making branch in Colombia, with most of not all laws having historically originated here (see Kline, 1995: 69-75). This examination of the role that business, landowning elites, and international actors have played in the policy decisions and outcomes of the Colombian state indicates that institutional approaches alone cannot fully explain the continuities and shifts in military and security policy.