Moral concerns on tradable pollution permits in international environmental agreements

被引:16
|
作者
Eyckmans, Johan [2 ,3 ]
Kverndokk, Snorre [1 ]
机构
[1] Ragnar Frisch Ctr Econ Res, N-0349 Oslo, Norway
[2] HUB, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
[3] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Ctr Econ Studien, B-3000 Louvain, Belgium
关键词
Tradable emission permits; International environmental agreements; Non-cooperative game theory; Moral motivation; Identity; JUSTICE; KYOTO;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.04.020
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
We investigate how moral concerns about permit trading affect an endogenous pollution permit trading equilibrium, where governments choose non-cooperatively the amount of permits they allocate to domestic industries. Politicians may feel reluctant to allow permit trading and/or may prefer that abatement is undertaken domestically because of moral concerns. This will have an effect on the initial permit allocations, and, therefore, on global emissions. The impact on global emissions depends on the precise formulation of the moral concerns, but under reasonable assumptions, we show that global emissions may increase. Thus, doing what is perceived as good does not always yield the desired outcome. However, this can be offset by restrictions on permit trading when governments have moral concerns about this trade. (C) 2010 Elsevier BM. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1814 / 1823
页数:10
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