How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation

被引:17
|
作者
Cerasi, Vittoria [1 ,2 ]
Deininger, Sebastian M. [3 ]
Gambacorta, Leonardo [4 ,5 ]
Oliviero, Tommaso [6 ,7 ]
机构
[1] Bicocca Univ, Dept Econ Management & Stat DEMS, Piazza Ateneo Nuovo 1, Milan 20126, Italy
[2] Bicocca Univ, Ctr European Studies CefES, Piazza Ateneo Nuovo 1, Milan 20126, Italy
[3] Basel Chamber Commerce, Basel, Switzerland
[4] BIS, Basel, Switzerland
[5] CEPR, Basel, Switzerland
[6] Univ Naples Federico II, Naples, Italy
[7] CSEF, Naples, Italy
关键词
Banks; Managerial compensation; Prudential regulation; Risk-taking; RISK; WAGES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2020.102153
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper assesses whether compensation practices for bank Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) changed after the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued post-crisis guidelines on sound compensation. CEO compensation has become more sensitive to risk, with CEOs in the post-reform period at riskier banks receiving less variable compensation than those at less-risky peers. This was particularly true of investment banks. The changes in compensation practices are in line with the FSB's Principles and Standards of Sound Compensation, although we do not detect significant differences between banks in jurisdictions that directly implemented the FSB guidelines compared to the other banks. (C) 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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页数:19
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