Managerial conservatism and corporate policies

被引:14
|
作者
Duong, Kiet Tuan [1 ]
Banti, Chiara [2 ]
Instefjord, Norvald [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Huddersfield, Huddersfield Business Sch, Huddersfield HD1 3DH, W Yorkshire, England
[2] Univ Essex, Essex Business Sch, Wivenhoe Pk, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England
关键词
CEO conservatism; CFO conservatism; Corporate policies; Signature style; SIGNATURE SIZE; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; SELF-ESTEEM; POLITICAL CONSERVATISM; PERSONALITY-TRAITS; CEO OVERCONFIDENCE; DIVIDEND POLICY; UPPER ECHELONS; AGENCY COSTS; NAME STYLES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101973
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates how conservative managers make corporate decisions. Motivated by psychology research, we use handwritten signatures (i.e., emotionally restraint disclosure styles) as a proxy for CEO conservatism. We find that firms with conservative CEOs engage more with safer investments (capital expenditures), engage less with risky policies (Research & Development expenses and debt financing), hold more cash, are less likely to pay cash dividends, and more likely to use stock repurchase schemes. We use the same proxy for CFO conservatism. We find that CFO conservatism is a better determinant than CEO conservatism for cash holding and financing policies, but the reverse is true for investment policies. Conservative CFOs prefer long-term debt to short-term debt.
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页数:26
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