Auction mechanisms for a competitive electric power market.

被引：0
|
作者：
Bernard, J [1 ]
Mount, T [1 ]
Schulze, W [1 ]
机构：
[1] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
来源：
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS | 1997年 / 79卷 / 05期
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号：
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：1709 / 1710
页数：2
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