The Illusion of Conscious Thought

被引:0
|
作者
Carruthers, Peter [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, Philosophy, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] Univ Sheffield, Philosophy, Sheffield, S Yorkshire, England
关键词
attention; confabulation; consciousness; self-knowledge; thought; working memory; WORKING-MEMORY CAPACITY; OVERT HEAD MOVEMENTS; FLUID INTELLIGENCE; INTEGRATED INFORMATION; SENSORY DISCRIMINATION; SECONDARY MEMORY; ATTENTION; DISSONANCE; BRAIN; MIND;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This paper argues that episodic thoughts (judgments, decisions, and so forth) are always unconscious. Whether consciousness is understood in terms of global broadcasting/widespread accessibility or in terms of non-interpretive higher-order awareness, the conclusion is the same: there is no such thing as conscious thought. Arguments for this conclusion are reviewed. The challenge of explaining why we should all be under the illusion that our thoughts are often conscious is then taken up.
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页码:228 / 252
页数:25
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