Personal connections;
Sovereign credit ratings;
Information asymmetries;
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS;
BANK RATINGS;
FRIENDS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.frl.2019.05.012
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
In a large sample of sovereign debt issues, we show that a personal connection between senior executives in credit rating agencies and leading politicians in the sovereign results in an improved rating. A test on bond yields suggest that the personal connection reflects a favorable treatment of the issuer.
机构:
Michigan State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, 316 S Kedzie Hall, E Lansing, MI 48824 USAMichigan State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, 316 S Kedzie Hall, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA