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The Basis of Human Moral Status
被引:53
|作者:
Liao, S. Matthew
[1
]
机构:
[1] Univ Oxford, Fac Philosophy, Oxford OX1 1PT, England
关键词:
moral agency;
moral standing;
moral status;
personhood;
sentience;
speciesism;
D O I:
10.1163/174552409X12567397529106
中图分类号:
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号:
摘要:
When philosophers consider what moral status human beings have, they tend to find themselves either supporting the idea that not all human beings are rightholders or adopting what Peter Singer calls a 'speciesist' position, where speciesism is defined as morally favoring a particular species-in this case, human beings-over others without sufficient justification. In this paper, I develop what I call the 'genetic basis for moral agency' account of rightholding, and I propose that this account can allow all human beings to be rightholders without being speciesist. While my aim is to set out this account clearly rather than to defend it, I explain how this account is different from a potentiality account and I argue that it is preferable to an actual moral agency account of human moral status.
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页码:159 / 179
页数:21
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