Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya

被引:430
|
作者
Duflo, Esther [1 ]
Dupas, Pascaline [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Kremer, Michael [5 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[3] CEPR, NBER, London, England
[4] BREAD, Ghent, Belgium
[5] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Littauer Ctr, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2011年 / 101卷 / 05期
关键词
ABILITY TRACKING; ACHIEVEMENT;
D O I
10.1257/aer.101.5.1739
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution. We propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in Kenya. While the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower-achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level. (JEL I21, J45, O15)
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页码:1739 / 1774
页数:36
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