Political economy of Ramsey taxation

被引:30
|
作者
Acemoglu, Daron [2 ]
Golosov, Mikhail [1 ]
Tsyvinski, Aleh [1 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Capital taxation; Fiscal policy; Political economy; OPTIMAL FISCAL-POLICY; REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY; TAXES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.014
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies. We show that, as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens, the Chamley-Judd result of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than the citizens, the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long-run capital taxation. (C) 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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页码:467 / 475
页数:9
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