Capital taxation;
Fiscal policy;
Political economy;
OPTIMAL FISCAL-POLICY;
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY;
TAXES;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.014
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies. We show that, as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens, the Chamley-Judd result of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than the citizens, the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long-run capital taxation. (C) 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.