A note on endogenous timing in duopoly games

被引:0
|
作者
Yang, Xiaohua [1 ]
Chen, Shengli [2 ]
机构
[1] Wuhan Texitle Univ, Dept Econ & Management, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China
[2] Xian Univ Finance & Econ, Dept Management, Xian 710061, Peoples R China
关键词
endogenous timing; reaction function; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium; PRICE LEADERSHIP; STACKELBERG;
D O I
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.204-210.545
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
We provide a general analysis of duopoly game in endogenous timing. The Nash equilibrium outcomes are compared with Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes. The different sets of conditions are provided for yielding respectively simultaneous and sequential plays and these conditions only depend on the monotonicities of the reaction functions and the payoffs functions in rival strategic variables.
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页码:545 / +
页数:2
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