Self-Consciousness

I distinguish two varieties of self-consciousness. One variety I label 'perspectival self-consciousness'. I propose an account of its nature, and consider its relations to: Gallup's mirror test for self-consciousness; Shoemaker's conception of immunity to error through misidentification; the possession of a conception of many minds; and some of Sartre's ideas on what it is to conceive of oneself as an object. A second variety of self-consciousness I label 'reflective self-consciousness'. I offer an account of this, its epistemological significance, and consider the ways in which perspectival self-consciousness and reflective self-consciousness have to cooperate if a thinker is to attain certain epistemic goals. I conclude with some reflections on the bearing of the metaphysics of subjects of consciousness, and the metaphysics of their properties, on the explanation of epistemic and conceptual phenomena.