Husserl's concept of the 'transcendental person': Another look at the Husserl-Heidegger relationship

This paper offers a further look at Husserl's late thought on the transcendental subject and the Husserl-Heidegger relationship. It attempts a reconstruction of how Husserl hoped to assert his own thoughts on subjectivity vis-a-vis Heidegger, while also pointing out where Husserl did not reach the new level that Heidegger attained. In his late manuscripts, Husserl employs the term 'transcendental person' to describe the transcendental ego in its fullest 'concretion'. I maintain that although this concept is a consistent development of Husserl's earlier analyses of constitution, Husserl was also defending himself against Heidegger, who criticized him for framing the subject in terms of transcendental ego rather than as Dasein. Husserl was convinced that he could successfully respond to Heidegger's critique, but he did not grasp that Heidegger's fundamental ontology was an immanent development, rather than a scathing criticism, of his own phenomenology.