Intergovernmental Organizations and Democratic Victory in International Crises

Research finds that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) influence domestic public opinion on foreign policy matters. This article applies these insights to crisis bargaining, arguing that IGO support will help democratic leaders prevail in crises, but it will have little systematic benefit for nondemocratic leaders. IGO support helps democratic leaders generate leverage by increasing domestic support for their policies. In turn, leaders with greater support will be more risk acceptant in crises and put greater pressure on their adversaries to make concessions. Such leaders will also face an increased likelihood of domestic punishment if they back down after receiving IGO approval. In contrast, nondemocratic leaders will see little advantage following IGO backing because domestic actors have fewer opportunities and face higher costs for punishing their leaders. The argument is empirically assessed on international crises from 1945 to 2006. The findings indicate strong and consistent support for theoretical expectations advanced in the article.