Unions' inflation aversion and international competitiveness

被引:1
|
作者
Di Bartolomeo, G [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Roma La Sapienza, Dept Publ Econ, I-00161 Rome, Italy
关键词
trade unions; inflation; terms of trade; open economy; policy games;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpolmod.2004.11.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper explores the consequences of economic integration on wage and monetary policy management. It studies the possibility that openness may discipline labor unions through potential losses created by the worsening in terms of trade (international competitiveness) associated with high wage claims. We find that, contrary to some recent literature, a monetary expansion fails to affect real outcomes and only results in higher inflation, since the claimed wage-moderation mechanism does not work when it is properly modeled. Hence, recent policy recommendations for an expansionary monetary policy in open economies result to be counterproductive, whereas low-inflation targeting remains a first best policy. (c) 2004 Society for Policy Modeling. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 142
页数:6
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