Cellular automata generalized to an inferential system

Stephen Wolfram popularized elementary one-dimensional cellular automata in his book, A New Kind of Science. Among many remarkable things, he proved that one of these cellular automata was a Universal Turing Machine. Such cellular automata can be interpreted in a different way by viewing them within the context of the formal manipulation rules from probability theory. Bayes's Theorem is the most famous of such formal rules. As a prelude, we recapitulate Jaynes's presentation of how probability theory generalizes classical logic using modus ponens as the canonical example. We emphasize the important conceptual standing of Boolean Algebra for the formal rules of probability manipulation and give an alternative demonstration augmenting and complementing Jaynes's derivation. We show the complementary roles played in arguments of this kind by Bayes's Tbeorem and joint probability tables. A good explanation for all of this is afforded by the expansion of any particular logic function via the disjunctive normal form (DNF). The DNF expansion is a useful heuristic emphasized in this exposition because such expansions point out where relevant Os should be placed in the joint probability tables for logic functions involving any number of variables. It then becomes a straightforward exercise to rely on Boolean Algebra, Bayes's Theorem, and joint probability tables in extrapolating to Wolfram's cellular automata. Cellular automata are seen as purely deductive systems, just like classical logic, which probability theory is then able to generalize. Thus, any uncertainties which we might like to introduce into the discussion about cellular automata are handled with ease via the familiar inferential path. Most importantly, the difficult problem of predicting what cellular automata will do in the far future is treated like any inferential prediction problem.