Inventory Financing with Overconfident Supplier Based on Supply Chain Contract

被引:14
|
作者
Jiang, Weifan [1 ,2 ]
Liu, Jian [1 ]
机构
[1] Jiangxi Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Informat Technol, Nanchang 330013, Jiangxi, Peoples R China
[2] Nanchang Inst Technol, Sch Business Adm, Nanchang 330099, Jiangxi, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
COORDINATION;
D O I
10.1155/2018/5054387
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
Overconfidence is a universal psychological behavior. Overconfidence on demand awareness will have a significant impact on operation decisions. The supplier estimated the demand with excessive precision which influences the inventory financing decision-making deeply. We built the demand function based on the supplier's overconfidence. Then we established the retailer, supplier, and the Bank's profit function, respectively. Through the analysis of the bilevel Stackelberg game, we obtained the order quantity of the retailer with the capital constraint, the wholesale price of overconfident supplier, and the loan-to-value ratio of Bank, and we analyzed the influence of overconfidence on the decision variables. We have several findings as follows. First, the overconfidence makes the decisions of the retailer, supplier, and Bank deviate from the rational decisions. Second, the space of the market profit will affect the decision variables in the joint decision-making. Third, the financing supply chain (including the Bank and supply chain) should have a positive attitude towards the overconfidence of the supplier. Forth, in the joint decision-making, the supplier need determines the buyback price according to the capital demand; and in the decentralized decision-making, the supplier should try to use high buyback price strategy.
引用
收藏
页数:12
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