Is There a Violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game?

被引：10
|
作者：
Li, Shu [1 ]
Wang, Zuo-Jun [1 ]
Rao, Li-Lin [1 ]
Li, Yan-Mei [1 ]
机构：
[1] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Psychol, Ctr Social & Econ Behav, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China
来源：
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR | 2010年 / 18卷 / 3-4期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
cooperation; competition; uncertain; losses; gains; sure-thing principle; SIZABLE GROUPS; LOSS AVERSION; EVOLUTION; COOPERATION; CHOICE; UNCERTAINTY; RECIPROCITY; THINKING; RISK;
D O I：
10.1177/1059712310366040
中图分类号：
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号：
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要：
This report seeks to determine whether the violation of Savage's sure-thing principle is robust enough to survive in an original payoff domain of the prisoner's dilemma game. It was found that the sure-thing principle was violated in the domain of gains as expected by Shafir and Tversky but obeyed in the domain of losses. It was further found that the sure-thing principle was also obeyed in the original prison sentence payoffs, which fall into the domain of losses. The findings suggest a reexamination of the application of the sure-thing principle in the prisoner's dilemma game.
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页码：377 / 385
页数：9
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