In a general equilibrium model, we allow for households with several, typically heterogeneous, members; households that make (efficient) collective consumption decisions where different households may use different collective decision mechanisms; yet households that operate within a competitive market environment. The interaction of two allocation mechanisms, collective decisions and competitive markets, is investigated, with a focus on the efficiency properties and decentralization possibilities of the dual allocation mechanism.
机构:
Res Inst Ind Econ IFN, Stockholm, Sweden
Univ Cambridge, Energy Policy Res Grp EPRG, Cambridge, England
Stanford Univ, Program Energy & Sustainable Dev PESD, Stanford, CA USARes Inst Ind Econ IFN, Stockholm, Sweden
Holmberg, Par
Ritz, Robert A.
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机构:
Univ Cambridge, Judge Business Sch, Energy Policy Res Grp EPRG, Cambridge, EnglandRes Inst Ind Econ IFN, Stockholm, Sweden