One-sided commitment in life insurance contracts: Evidence from Health and Retirement Study

被引：0
|
作者：
Wu, Xi [1 ]
Gan, Li [2 ]
机构：
[1] Capital Univ Econ & Business, Int Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100070, Peoples R China
[2] Texas A&M Univ, Dept Econ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2022年 / 219卷
基金：
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助; 中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Life insurance; One-sided commitment;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110825
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study the properties of long-term insurance contracts using an individual-level survey data. Results indicate longer-term contracts are involved with lower lapse rates and healthier pool. These are consistent with the implications of Hendel and Lizzeri model with one-sided commitment. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：3
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