Life Expectancy Heterogeneity and the Political Support for Collective Annuities

被引:1
|
作者
Cremer, Helmuth [1 ]
De Donder, Philippe [1 ]
机构
[1] Toulouse Sch Econ, FR-31015 Toulouse, France
来源
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 118卷 / 03期
关键词
Collective annuity; generosity; Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium; longevity; pay-as-you-go pensions; redistributiveness; D78; H55; SOCIAL-SECURITY; SELECTION;
D O I
10.1111/sjoe.12153
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non-contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.
引用
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页码:594 / 615
页数:22
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