Coordination of a dual-channel supply chain after demand or production cost disruptions

被引:100
|
作者
Zhang, Pan [1 ]
Xiong, Yu [2 ]
Xiong, Zhongkai [1 ]
机构
[1] Chongqing Univ, Sch Econ & Business Adm, Chongqing 630044, Peoples R China
[2] Univ E Anglia, Norwich Business Sch, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
game theory; dual-channel; disruption management; supply chain coordination; REVENUE-SHARING CONTRACT; PRODUCTION DECISIONS; COMPETING RETAILERS; DISTRIBUTION-SYSTEM; DOMINANT RETAILER; ONE MANUFACTURER; MANAGEMENT; ENCROACHMENT; STRATEGIES; CONFLICT;
D O I
10.1080/00207543.2014.975853
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain could not only achieve the integrated profit of the supply chain but also alleviate the channel conflict. Although some researches addressed this area, there is scant literature to discuss the coordination issue in the situations of disruption. To fill this void, we utilise a contract with a wholesale price, a direct channel's price and a lump sum fee to coordinate a dual-channel supply chain under the cases of demand disruptions and production cost disruptions. After deriving the optimal contract for each case, we find that the manufacturer can achieve coordination of the disrupted supply chain by adjusting the parameters of the coordination contract used in a normal environment. We also show that after disruptions, there exists a contract adjustment benefit zone, in which both the manufacturer and the retailer can benefit from the adjustment of coordination contract when demand increases or production cost decreases. A further analysis of the production and distribution strategies in the coordinated dual-channel supply chain after disruptions suggests that the adjustment of the total production and sales of each channel depends heavily on the level of disruptions and the degree of consumers' loyalty to both channels.
引用
收藏
页码:3141 / 3160
页数:20
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