Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games

被引：2
|
作者：
Shimoji, Makoto [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ York, Dept Econ & Related Studies, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2022年 / 51卷 / 3-4期
关键词：
Bayesian persuasion; Multiple receivers; Heterogeneous beliefs; Rationalizability; INFORMATION DISCLOSURE; RATIONALIZABILITY; UNIQUENESS; TALK;
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-021-00800-1
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Originating from Kamenica and Gentzkow (Am Econ Rev 101(6):2590-2615, 2011), we analyze multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion games with heterogeneous beliefs without strategic interactions among receivers, which we call unlinked. We show that given the receivers' best-responses, the sender's rationalizable strategies are obtained from a single linear programming problem.
引用
收藏
页码：451 / 481
页数：31
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Fine tuning the persuasion in persuasive games
    Khaled, Rilla
    Barr, Pippin
    Noble, James
    Fischer, Ronald
    Biddle, Robert
    PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY, 2007, 4744 : 36 - +
  • [32] SIGNALLING BY BAYESIAN PERSUASION AND PRICING STRATEGY
    Chen, Yanlin
    Zhang, Jun
    ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 2020, 130 (628): : 976 - 1007
  • [33] Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
    Babichenko, Yakov
    Talgam-Cohen, Inbal
    Xu, Haifeng
    Zabarnyi, Konstantin
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2022, 136 : 226 - 248
  • [34] Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion with Combinatorial Actions
    Fujii, Kaito
    Sakaue, Shinsaku
    THIRTY-SIXTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / THIRTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / THE TWELVETH SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2022, : 5016 - 5024
  • [35] Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
    Hedlund, Jonas
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2017, 167 : 229 - 268
  • [36] Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion
    Li, Quan
    Rong, Kang
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2024, 53 (02) : 525 - 545
  • [37] Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
    Matyskova, Ludmila
    Montes, Alfonso
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2023, 211
  • [38] Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
    Daehong Min
    Economic Theory, 2021, 72 : 743 - 764
  • [39] Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps
    Perez-Richet, Eduardo
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2014, 104 (05): : 469 - 474
  • [40] Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Bayesian Persuasion
    Agrawal, Shipra
    Feng, Yiding
    Tang, Wei
    ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 36 (NEURIPS 2023), 2023,
12345