Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games

被引:2
|
作者
Shimoji, Makoto [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ York, Dept Econ & Related Studies, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England
关键词
Bayesian persuasion; Multiple receivers; Heterogeneous beliefs; Rationalizability; INFORMATION DISCLOSURE; RATIONALIZABILITY; UNIQUENESS; TALK;
D O I
10.1007/s00182-021-00800-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Originating from Kamenica and Gentzkow (Am Econ Rev 101(6):2590-2615, 2011), we analyze multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion games with heterogeneous beliefs without strategic interactions among receivers, which we call unlinked. We show that given the receivers' best-responses, the sender's rationalizable strategies are obtained from a single linear programming problem.
引用
收藏
页码:451 / 481
页数:31
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