Skin in the game: General partner capital commitment, investment behavior and venture capital fund performance

被引:9
|
作者
Jia, Ning [1 ]
Wang, Dan [1 ]
机构
[1] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Weilun Bldg 201F, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Venture capital; General partners; Limited partners; Capital commitment; Investment behavior; Performance; PORTFOLIO MANAGER OWNERSHIP; ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; SUCCESS EVIDENCE; DECISION SPEED; PRIVATE FIRMS; COMPENSATION; INDUSTRY; MARKET; CHINA;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.09.008
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the impact of general partners' (GPs) own investment (capital commitment) in the venture capital (VC) fund they manage on their investment behavior and fund performance. Using a unique dataset with detailed information on VC fund ownership structure, we find that GPs' capital commitment has an inverted U-shaped relationship with investment speed, investment distance, and industry specialization. GPs' capital commitment is also associated with greater exit success. These effects are more pronounced for VC funds with less monitoring by limited partners (LPs). Findings of this paper shed new light on the governance role of managerial ownership in the VC industry and on the GP-LP relationship. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:110 / 130
页数:21
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