Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests

被引：7
|
作者：
Keskin, Kerim [1 ]
机构：
[1] Kadir Has Univ, Dept Econ, Istanbul, Turkey
来源：
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2018年 / 96卷
关键词：
RISK-AVERSION; DISAPPOINTMENT; SHAPE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.06.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests. Characterizing the equilibrium effort levels, we present results on the existence of equilibrium and total rent dissipation. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：85 / 91
页数：7
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