Political lobbying, insider trading, and CEO compensation

被引:7
|
作者
Brodmann, Jennifer [1 ]
Unsal, Omer [2 ]
Hassan, M. Kabir [3 ]
机构
[1] Calif State Univ Dominguez Hills, Dept Accounting Finance & Econ, 1000 E Victoria St, Carson, CA 90747 USA
[2] Merrimack Coll, Girard Sch Business, 315 Turnpike St, N Andover, MA 01845 USA
[3] Univ New Orleans, Dept Econ & Finance, Kirschman Hall,2000 Lakeshore Dr, New Orleans, LA 70148 USA
关键词
Insider trading; Political lobbying; Firm performance; STOCK OPTION AWARDS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; CONNECTED BOARDS; RESTRICTIONS; STRATEGY;
D O I
10.1016/j.iref.2018.10.020
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In this study, we determine why CEOs from lobbying firms receive higher pay compared to their non-lobbying peers. We investigate whether insider trading can explain high CEO pay. Using hand-collected firm-level lobbying data, we examine whether CEOs from lobbying firms engage in insider trading after sponsored bills are introduced and passed in the U.S. Congress. Our results show that the number of CEO stock transactions from lobbying firms correlates with bills being passed, which yields higher compensation packages. In addition, we find that lobbying benefits firm performance. Lobbying firms receive more government contracts, which increases firm value. Overall, lobbying benefits both CEOs and shareholders.
引用
收藏
页码:548 / 565
页数:18
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