Strategy-Proof Beam-Aware Multicast Resource Allocation Mechanism

被引:1
|
作者
Su, Pan-Yang [1 ]
Li, Yi-Yun [2 ]
Wei, Hung-Yu [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Natl Taiwan Univ, Dept Elect Engn, Taipei, Taiwan
[2] Natl Taiwan Univ, Grad Inst Commun Engn, Taipei, Taiwan
关键词
D O I
10.1109/WOCC53213.2021.9602884
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Wireless multicast is a rising technology for delivering data from one base station (BS) to multiple mobile stations (MSs) using resource sharing to increase system efficiency. Beam forming is a feature of the 5G base station commonly used in wireless multicast to increase system throughput. However, when we take both beamforming and multicast into account, allocating the resources becomes a considerable problem. In this paper, we propose a beam-aware multicast resource allocation mechanism based on bid transformation and a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. Our analysis shows that the mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational, (weak) budget-balanced, and maximizes social welfare. Moreover, the proposed mechanism runs in polynomial time.
引用
收藏
页码:75 / 79
页数:5
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