COORDINATION IN MARKETS WITH CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES: ADVERTISING AND PRODUCT QUALITY

被引：2
|
作者：
Pastine, Ivan [1 ]
Pastine, Tuvana [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Coll Dublin, Sch Econ, Dublin, Ireland
[2] Natl Univ Ireland Maynooth, Maynooth, Kildare, Ireland
来源：
MANCHESTER SCHOOL | 2011年 / 79卷 / 01期
关键词：
ALL-PAY AUCTION; INFORMATION; SIGNALS; PRICE;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02186.x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper we study advertising in markets with positive consumption externalities. In such markets, we show that firms may engage in advertising competition to coordinate consumer expectations on their own brand as long as they produce goods of similar quality. The firm with the lower-quality product has a greater incentive to advertise. Hence in equilibrium, the lower-quality product will often be more popular.
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页码：45 / 62
页数：18
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