On the Problem of Collective Moral Responsibility of Unstructured Groups

The hypothesis of the article is the idea that the collective moral responsibility is meaningful also at the level of unstructured groups, which do not have a stable identity capable of persisting over time. According to the author, such a grouping does not necessarily have to fulfill the conditions specific to a structured group in order to have the status of an agent and be able to bear moral responsibility (for example to avert evil in situations requiring collective action); nor does it need to possess the qualities that are usually a prerequisite to classify an agent as responsible for its actions - such as autonomy of will, cognitive ability, intention, and control over its actions. Regarding the question of collective moral responsibility for the consequences of a collective action (or collective inactivity), the author suggests: a) to use Ricceur's concept of responsibility in its specific moral dimension involving the relationship with others; b) to modify the archaic "all for one" principle so that, instead of solidarity with the transgressor, it implies solidarity with those in distress or with those who are experiencing injustice.