The Firm Strikes Back: Non-compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals

被引:109
|
作者
Marx, Matt [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
关键词
internal labor markets; externalized labor markets; mobility; employment contracts; SILICON VALLEY; ARRANGEMENTS; INEQUALITY; EMPLOYMENT; TRENDS;
D O I
10.1177/0003122411414822
中图分类号
C91 [社会学];
学科分类号
030301 ; 1204 ;
摘要
This study explores how firms shape labor markets and career paths using employee non-compete agreements. The sociology of work has overlooked non-competes, but data indicate that nearly half of technical professionals in the United States are asked to sign such employment contracts. Fearing loss of investments in talent and trade secrets, firms use non-competes to "strike back" against technical professionals' increased mobility following the decline of internal labor markets. In-depth interviews with 52 randomly sampled patent holders in a single industry, coupled with a survey of 1,029 engineers across a variety of industries, reveal that ex-employees subject to non-competes are more likely to take career detours-that is, they involuntarily leave their technical field to avoid a potential lawsuit. Moreover, firms strategically manage the process of getting workers to sign such contracts, waiting for workers' bargaining position to weaken. These findings inform our understanding of the social organization of work in the knowledge economy.
引用
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页码:695 / 712
页数:18
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