A Competition Perspective on Physician Non-compete Agreements
被引:0
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作者:
Gilman, Daniel J.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Int Ctr Law & Econ, Portland, OR USA
Int Ctr Law & Econ, Competit Policy, 1104 NW 15th Ave,Ste 300, Portland, OR 97209 USAInt Ctr Law & Econ, Portland, OR USA
Gilman, Daniel J.
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Int Ctr Law & Econ, Portland, OR USA
[2] Int Ctr Law & Econ, Competit Policy, 1104 NW 15th Ave,Ste 300, Portland, OR 97209 USA
non-compete;
antitrust;
competition;
labor;
physician;
health care competition;
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS;
MARKET CONCENTRATION;
ORGANIZATION;
D O I:
10.1177/00469580241237621
中图分类号:
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号:
摘要:
Physician non-compete agreements may have significant competitive implications, and effects on both providers and patients, but they are treated variously under the law on a state-by-state basis. Reviewing the relevant law and the economic literature cannot identify with confidence the net effects of such agreements on either physicians or health care delivery with any generality. In addition to identifying future research projects to inform policy, it is argued that the antitrust "rule of reason" provides a useful and established framework with which to evaluate such agreements in specific health care markets and, potentially, to address those agreements most likely to do significant damage to health care competition and consumers.