Externalities and Taxation of Supplemental Insurance: A Study of Medicare and Medigap

被引:22
|
作者
Cabral, Marika [1 ,2 ]
Mahoney, Neale [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Austin, 1 Univ Stn BRB 1-116,C3100, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Chicago Booth, 5807 S Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
ADVERSE SELECTION; HEALTH; COST; HAZARD; INCOME;
D O I
10.1257/app.20160350
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Most health insurance uses cost-sharing to reduce excess utilization. Supplemental insurance can blunt the impact of this cost-sharing, increasing utilization and exerting a negative externality on the primary insurer. This paper estimates the effect of private Medigap supplemental insurance on public Medicare spending using Medigap premium discontinuities in local medical markets that span state boundaries. Using administrative data on the universe of Medicare beneficiaries, we estimate that Medigap increases an individual's Medicare spending by 22.2 percent. We calculate that a 15 percent tax on Medigap premiums generates savings of $12.9 billion annually with a standard error of $4.9 billion. (JEL G22, H24, H51, I13, J14)
引用
收藏
页码:37 / 73
页数:37
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