Soft budget constraints and ownership: Empirical evidence from US hospitals

被引：12
|
作者：
Eggleston, Karen [1 ]
Shen, Yu-Chu [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Stanford Univ, Shorenstein Asia Pacific Res Ctr, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] USN, Postgrad Sch, Monterey, CA USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2011年 / 110卷 / 01期
关键词：
Soft budget constraints; Ownership; Health care; For-profit; Hospital quality;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.016
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Consistent with the property rights theory of ownership incorporating soft budget constraints (SBCs), we find that controlling for SBCs, for-profit hospitals drop safety-net services more often and exhibit higher mortality rates, suggesting aggressive cost control that damages non-contractible quality. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：7 / 11
页数：5
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