Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions

被引：2

作者：

Cerrone, Claudia ^{[1
]}

Hermstruewer, Yoan ^{[2
]}

Robalo, Pedro ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Middlesex Univ, London NW4 4BT, England

[2] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Kurt Schumacher Str 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2021年 / 129卷

关键词：

Debarment; Collusion; Procurement auctions; Sanctions; TACIT COLLUSION; LENIENCY; COMMUNICATION; ORGANIZATION; COMPETITION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments - the exclusion of colluding bidders - on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The deterrent effect of debarments increases in the length of the punishment. However, shorter debarments reduce efficiency and increase the bids of non-debarred bidders. This suggests that debarments that are too lenient may trigger tacit collusion among the bidders who remain in the market, thereby facilitating the very behavior they aim to deter. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：114 / 143

页数：30

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