Distributive Politics with Vote and Turnout Buying

被引:10
|
作者
Casas, Agustin [1 ]
机构
[1] Colegio Univ Estudios Financieros CUNEF, Calle Leonardo Prieto Castro 2, Madrid 28040, Spain
关键词
REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS; MACHINE POLITICS; PERCEPTIONS; CLIENTELISM; DEMOCRACY;
D O I
10.1017/S0003055418000291
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The objective of this paper is to model the incumbent's allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying (persuasion) and turnout buying (mobilization). The existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts. This paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobilization strategies, and the ideology of voters is unknown to the incumbent party, a third option should be taken into account. In fact, the optimal allocation of resourcesrather than focusing on safe or swing districtsshould target opposition strongholds, that is, the incumbent should try to sway voters in those districts in which the challenger is favored. The intuition for this result is simple. Since the incumbent does not know individual preferences (he only observes the distribution of preferences in the districts), all voters in a given district look identical to him. Hence, when approaching voters in a district to buy their vote, the incumbent always faces the risk of buying the vote of his supporters (who would have voted for him anyway).
引用
收藏
页码:1111 / 1119
页数:9
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